Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 22–23, 1897 Decided May 24, 1897
Full case name	Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Company
Citations	167 U.S. 479 (more) 17 S. Ct. 896; 42 L. Ed. 243; 1897 U.S. LEXIS 2111
Case history
Prior	Certiorari from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Court membership
Chief Justice Melville Fuller Associate Justices Stephen J. Field · John M. Harlan Horace Gray · David J. Brewer Henry B. Brown · George Shiras Jr. Edward D. White · Rufus W. Peckham
Case opinions
Majority	Brewer, joined by Fuller, Field, Gray, Brown, Shiras, White, Peckham
Dissent	Harlan
Laws applied
Interstate Commerce Act

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co., 167 U.S. 479 (1897), also called the Queen and Crescent Case, was an important early US Supreme Court case in the development of American administrative law.

Background

Administrative law

In the United States, administrative agencies operate within the Executive Branch, rather than the Legislative Branch of Congress. The scope of their authority is determined by the explicit provisions of its organic statute, rather than implied regulatory areas. The major questions doctrine further restricts administrative law in areas of major political or economic significance.

Case

The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) set rates for rail transport, ordering all rail companies to either comply or cease their operations. In a lawsuit appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the ICC sought an injunction forcing the Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway into compliance. The Sixth Circuit sent a certified question to the US Supreme Court, asking:

Had the interstate commerce commission jurisdictional power to make the order hereinbefore set forth; all proceedings preceding said order being due and regular, so far as procedure is concerned?

Supreme Court

The ICC's authority stemmed from its organic statute, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. After finding that this act did not expressly authorize the setting of railroad rates, the Supreme Court analyzed the act's first section, which provided that "all charges [...] should be reasonable and just; and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such serve is prohibited and declared to be unlawful." The ICC argued that Congress' failure to specify "reasonable charges" implicitly authorized the agency to set this standard. However, in a majority opinion written by Associate Justice David J. Brewer, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that organic statutes can only grant executive and administrative powers, not legislative authority over rail transport rates.

Associate Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented without writing an opinion.

Legacy

In 1906, Congress passed the Hepburn Act to explicitly grant such rate-setting power. Legal scholar Thomas W. Merrill and retired Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer have cited the Supreme Court's acceptance of the Hepburn Act to rebut the nondelegation doctrine.

External links

• Works related to Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co. at Wikisource
• Text of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co., 167 U.S. 479 (1897) is available from: CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress OpenJurist